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Case C-109/01, Secretary of State for the Home Department v. H. Akrich,
judgment of the Full Court of 23 September 2003, [2003] ECR I-9607.
1. Introduction
The ruling in Akrich,1 delivered by the full Court, concerns fundamental is-
sues of policy in relation to the impact of Community law upon Member
States immigration rules: how far can the Union citizens’ right to gain entry
and residence permits for their spouses in situations regulated by Commu-
nity law be used to circumvent the national provisions controlling migration
fluxes from outside the Union?2 Can a Union citizen’s spouse who is unlaw-
fully present in the Union territory rely on Community law to rectify his le-
gal situation? The issue is one of great importance for migration policies:
first of all, there is a significant danger of marriages of convenience; sec-
ondly, there is a widespread tendency to penalise abuses of immigration
rules with deportation. Thus, many Member States provide that marriage can
never be used to rectify the illegal status of a third country national, and that
therefore a person who is unlawfully present within the State’s territory has
in any case to leave and apply for entrance clearance from her own State of
origin. However, if the situation were to fall within the scope of Article 10
Regulation 1612/68,3 deportation would not be possible unless justified by
the public policy derogation.
1. Also annotated by White, under the title “Conflicting Competences: Free Movement
Rules and Immigration Laws”, 29 EL Rev. (2003), 385.
2. Another important issue now relates to the possibility for Union citizens who have no
link with any of the Member States, to exploit their citizenship to enter and reside in a Member
State other than that which granted citizenship, see Case C-200/02, Chen, judgment of 19 Octo-
ber 2004. For a similar issue, turning on nationality rules, see the older Case C-369/90,
Micheletti and others v. Delegación del Gobierno en Cantabria, [1992] ECR I-4239.
3. Council Regulation 1612/68, on freedom of movement for workers within the Commu-
nity O.J. 1968, Spec Ed No L 257/2, as amended. Consolidated version available at
www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/consleg/pdf/1968/en_1968R1612_do_001.pdf (hereinafter Regu-
lation 1612/68); Art. 10 Regulation 1612/68 will soon be repealed and replaced by the provisions
under Directive 2004/38, on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States O.J. 2004, L 158/77 (hereinaf-
ter Directive 2004/38). Directive 2004/38 improves the rights of third country national family
members, inter alia, by providing for the retention (conditional upon given requirements) of
the right to reside of third country nationals upon divorce from, or death of, the main
rightholder (Arts. 12 and 13); and by providing for the possibility of a right to permanent
residence (Arts. 16 et seq.).
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It is clear that the right to family reunification provided by secondary leg-
islation was drafted with a very simple situation in mind – that of a Union
citizen, already married to a third country national,4 who wished to move to
another Member State to there exercise an economic activity. Since the
Union citizen was assumed to have a right to live with her spouse in the
country of origin, deprivation of that right would result in a significant hin-
drance to movement. However, in such a simple scenario, the Member State
of origin would have already cleared the immigration status of the third
country national spouse; in this sense Article 10 Regulation 1612/68 might
be seen as requiring a sort of mechanism of mutual recognition, intended to
make the enjoyment of the free movement rights fully effective. However,
matters become more complicated when the immigration status of the third
country national has not been previously cleared, either because she was un-
lawfully present in the Union territory at the time of marriage, or because
marriage post-dates movement. In those cases, Community law might well
impinge upon migration policies, an area which is tainted by complex politi-
cal choices, as well as much populist rhetoric.
2. Factual background
Mr Akrich was a Moroccan citizen. He first entered the United Kingdom in
1989 on a tourist visa and was subsequently denied leave to remain as a stu-
dent. A few months later, he was found guilty of attempted theft and posses-
sion of a stolen identity card and as a result he was deported to Algiers. A
year or so later he was arrested in the United Kingdom and again deported to
Algiers. He returned illegally to the United Kingdom and in 1996 – whilst he
was unlawfully present in the UK – he married a British citizen and applied
for leave to remain as her spouse. His application was rejected and he was
detained and then removed – at his own request – to Dublin where his wife
had meanwhile gone to work. Mrs Akrich moved to Ireland with the sole in-
tention of triggering the Treaty and thus being able to rely on the Singh rul-
ing, which guarantees to Union citizens the right to bring back their spouses
upon returning to their Member State of origin after having exercised one of
the Treaty (economic) free movement provisions.5
4. For a comprehensive review of the rights of third country national family members, see
Barrett “Family matters: European Community law and third-country family members”, 40
CML Rev. (2003), 369.
5. Case C-370/90, The Queen v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Singh, ex parte Secre-
tary of State for the Home Department, [1992] ECR I-4265.
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Mr Akrich then applied for the revocation of the deportation order and for
leave to enter and remain in the UK as the spouse of a British citizen. The
Secretary of State for immigration refused to revoke the deportation order,
and refused to grant entry clearance on the basis of the Singh ruling, relying
on the fact that Mrs Akrich moved to Ireland only temporarily and with the
sole purpose of triggering the Treaty. Therefore, in the Secretary of State’s
opinion, she could be refused the benefits granted by Community law since
she had not been “genuinely” exercising her Article 39 EC rights and had
moved with the sole intention of evading the UK’s immigration rules.
Mr Akrich appealed against the decision of the Secretary of State and the
Immigration Adjudicator found that the exercise of Mrs Akrich right to move
under Community law was effective and was not tainted by her intention to
go back to the UK and rely on the Singh ruling. The Adjudicator also found
that Mr Akrich did not constitute a sufficient threat to public policy to justify
the continuation of the deportation order. The Secretary of State appealed
against this decision; during the appeal, the Appeal Tribunal requested a pre-
liminary ruling from the Court of Justice enquiring whether a Member State
is entitled to regard the intention of those who have exercised a Community
law right in order to evade the application of national law; and if so whether
the Member State is entitled to refuse to revoke a deportation order and to
refuse to accord the right of entry to the non-national spouse.
3. Advocate General Geelhoed’s Opinion
The Advocate General started with a brief overview of Member States’ im-
migration policies in respect of third country nationals and in particular in
respect of third country national spouses and sham marriages. He then re-
viewed the rights to move and reside of both economically active and eco-
nomically inactive Union citizens together with the right of third country
national spouses. The Advocate General noted that Article 10 Regulation
1612/68 does not make the rights of third country national spouses condi-
tional upon nature or duration of the marriage;6 and that Directive 64/2217
imposes strict requirements on the possibility of invoking the public policy
6. Similarly Directive 2004/38 does not make the right to enter and reside in the Member
State where the Union spouse has moved conditional.
7. Directive 64/221, on the co-ordination of special measures concerning the movement
and residence of foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public policy, public secu-
rity or public health O.J. 1964 Spec. Ed, No 850/64 (hereinafter Directive 64/221); Directive
64/221 will be repealed in its entirety once Directive 2004/38 comes into force.
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derogation. However, in purely internal situations the right for the third
country national spouse to gain entry and residence might be (legitimately)
made conditional upon individual circumstances, such as the duration of the
marriage and the nature of the union.
After these preliminary observations, the Advocate General ventured in
the analysis of the substantive provisions regulating the case at stake, and es-
pecially Article 39 EC, the scope of the Singh ruling, and the extent to which
a possible abuse of Community law (i.e. the instrumental use of Community
law to circumvent provisions of national law) might affect the rights granted
by the Treaty to Union citizens.
Mr Geelhoed identified as the main question for consideration, the issue
as to whether Community law, and in particular the Court’s interpretation in
the Singh ruling, granted rights also to those third country spouses who are
present in the Union territory unlawfully, and thus have not undergone that
individual assessment which characterizes immigration rules for non-Union
citizens. In fact, in Mr Geelhoed’s opinion, once it is accepted that the person
is the spouse of a Union citizen for the purposes of Regulation 1612/68, or
even for the purposes of Article 18 EC, no individual assessment may be car-
ried out (not even as to whether the marriage is genuine) and the right to en-
try and reside can be limited only having regard to the Treaty derogations
(which are interpreted narrowly).
Mr Geelhoed found that the Singh ruling could not be interpreted as
granting third country nationals a right to enter the territory of the European
Union without being subjected to the previous assessment required by immi-
gration law. In the Advocate General’s opinion the broad and generous inter-
pretation of the free movement rights presupposes controls at the external
borders of the Union. Thus, “internal freedom of movement of persons can-
not function properly if it is made easier for nationals of non-Member States
to use Community law in order to gain entry to the European Union without
its having been possible to apply controls on entry”.8 Therefore, in his opin-
ion, Article 10 Regulation 1612/68 can be limited in cases in which the third
country national spouse has not been granted entry clearance in the territory
of the European Union in conformity with immigration law. Nor in this case
was Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights particularly rel-
evant; in this respect, the Advocate General distinguished the facts at issue
here from those at issue in Carpenter: in the latter case, the matter was one
of forced separation, whilst in the former, the couple could have continued to
live together in Ireland.9
8. Opinion, para 135.
9. Of course one might well query whether, given what the A.G. had said about lawful
Court of Justice 229
The Advocate General then turned to assess whether Mrs Akrich, the main
right holder, fell within the scope of Community law. First, he found – not
surprisingly – that all the objections raised by the UK to curtail Mrs Akrich
rights under Community law were untenable. Thus, and this is consistent
case law,10 the reason “why” a worker moves is immaterial for Article 39 EC
to be triggered. Secondly, the public policy derogation could not be success-
fully invoked as there was no evidence that Mr Akrich – despite his criminal
conviction – constituted a sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest
of society, if that provision had to be interpreted within the narrow param-
eters established by Directive 64/221 and the Court’s case law.11 Thirdly,
there was no possibility of invoking the doctrine of “misuse of Community
law”: the Advocate General compared the case at issue to that in Centros,12
and found that just as in Centros, Mr and Mrs Akrich moved and installed
themselves in another Member State (a key element of the right to move
freely) and even though they were “using” the rights granted by Community
law for a purpose not foreseen by the EC legislature, such purpose was “in-
herent” in Community law. He then concluded that even though Mrs Akrich
was a worker protected by Community law, and even though Mr Akrich fell
within the material scope of Article 10 Regulation 1612/68, it was open to
the UK to rely on an overriding national interest in order to deny entrance to
the worker’s spouse, following a prior individual assessment, on the basis of
national immigration law. This was the case since Mr Akrich had not been
admitted to the Union in accordance with the immigration laws of any of the
Member States.
4. The Judgment of the Court
The Court followed a different legal analysis from the Advocate General. It
started by assessing the scope of the Singh ruling. It restated that own nation-
als returning to their Member State of origin after having taken advantage of
residence as a precondition for enjoying rights under Community law, the couple had a right to
stay in Ireland.
10. E.g. Case 53/81, Levin, [1982] ECR 1035, even though the reasons for taking up em-
ployment might be relevant to assess entitlement to social advantages, Case 197/86, Brown,
[1988] ECR 3205 (although Brown has been partially overruled by Case C-184/99, R Grzelczyk
v. Centre public d’aide social d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, [2001] ECR I-6193, it is still
good law on the relevance of intention), or to assess whether the activity is too marginal and
ancillary to be considered employment, Case 344/87, Bettray, [1989] ECR 1621.
11. E.g. Case 30/77, R v. Pierre Bouchereau, [1977] ECR 1999.
12. Case C-212/97, Centros ltd and Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, [1999] ECR I-1459.
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the right to free movement enjoy the same rights as are conferred upon na-
tionals of other Member States wishing to establish themselves – with their
spouse – in a Member State in order to exercise an economic activity. How-
ever, the Court also found that Regulation 1612/68 is silent as to the condi-
tion of entry in the Union of third country national spouses. In the Court’s
finding, Article 10 Regulation 1612/68 applies only to a spouse who is law-
fully resident in a Member State before moving to another Member State. In
reaching this conclusion the Court adopted a traditional discrimination dis-
course: the reason why Article 10 Regulation 1612/68 confers on the
worker’s spouse the right to reside and work in another Member State, is to
ensure that movement would not result in family separation. However, if the
spouse is not lawfully present within the territory of the Member State of
provenance, then there is no right for the couple to live together there. There-
fore the fact that the third country national spouse (unlawfully present) can-
not follow the Union citizen in another Member State does not result in any
obstacle: as there was no right to start with, movement does not result in any
loss. This said, the Court reiterated its case law on abuse of Community law
– the reason why a worker moves is immaterial to the enjoyment of the rights
conferred by the Treaty. The only possibility for abuse arises in the case in
which the couple has contracted a marriage of convenience in order to enjoy
the rights granted by Community law. In this case, Article 10 Regulation
1612/68 would not be applicable.
The Court then proceeded to assess the fundamental rights question in
what is probably the most obscure part of the ruling. The Court found that in
the case in which the spouse is not lawfully living in the territory of a Mem-
ber State (and provided the marriage is genuine), the Member State where
the couple seeks entrance must have regard to the right to family life as guar-
anteed by the European Convention of Human Rights.
5. Analysis
Neither the Advocate General’s Opinion nor the Court’s ruling can be said to
benefit from an entirely persuasive legal analysis. The Opinion, even though
thorough in assessing previous case law and the scope of Community rights,
is in the end rather disappointing, as the Advocate General fails to explain
why and how a right which is phrased in unconditional terms – i.e. the right
for a worker to bring her spouse in another Member State – can be limited
through a doctrine resonant of the imperative requirements doctrine. If Mr
and Mrs Akrich fell within the material and personal scope of application of
the Treaty and of Regulation 1612/68, it is difficult to understand how their
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rights under Article 10 Regulation 1612/68 could be limited for overriding
reasons of public interest (whilst of course they could be limited according
to the narrower public policy derogation).
The Court’s analysis avoids this trap and, in line with the aims of Regula-
tion 1612/68, finds that a spouse of a worker who is not lawfully resident in
the Union prior to marriage does not gain any right from Community law.
This said, the ruling is not without considerable inconsistencies and some
hermeneutic somersaults which are difficult to follow and conceptualize.
First, the Court fails to relate its reasoning to the two most important recent
rulings in the field of the rights of third country national spouses of Union
citizens, MRAX and Carpenter.13 Secondly, it is not clear why the Court in-
structed the Appeal Tribunal to have due regard to Article 8 of the European
Convention of Human Rights. If the matter fell outside the scope of Commu-
nity law – as the Court seems to imply when stating that Article 10 Regula-
tion 1612/68 does not apply – why a reference to the application of the
general principles of Community law? These two questions will now be ad-
dressed in turn.
5.1. Relationship with existing case law – MRAX v. Akrich
Whilst the ruling under examination does not affect the ruling in Singh – af-
ter all the main point of that ruling was the equation of own nationals return-
ing to their own Member State to non-nationals exercising their right of free
movement – it is difficult to reconcile it with the rulings in MRAX (not even
mentioned by the Court) and Carpenter. In MRAX, the Court held that Mem-
ber States cannot deny entry to third country national spouses on the sole
ground that the claimant has not obtained the required visa. Rather, the fact
that Article 3(2) of Directive 68/360 and Article 3(2) of Directive 73/148,14
13. Case C-459/99, Mouvement contre le racisme, l’antisémitisme et la xénophobie ASBL
(MRAX) v. Belgium, [2002] ECR I-6591; Case C-60/00, Carpenter v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department [2002] ECR I-6279. In Case C-413/99, Baumbast and R v. Secretary of
State for the Home Department, [2002] ECR I-7091, the Court found that a third country na-
tional who is the main carer of children in education derives a right to reside from her
children’s Community law right to reside. However, in that case Mrs R was lawfully present in
the United Kingdom, the issue being one of failure to renew her residence permit.
14. Directive 68/360, O.J. 1968, Spec. Ed L 257/13, on the abolition of restrictions on
movement and residence within the Community for workers of Member States and their family
(hereinafter, Directive 68/360); Directive 73/148, O.J. 1973, L 172/14, on the abolition of re-
strictions on movement and residence within the Community for nationals of Member States
with regard to establishment and the provision of services (hereinafter, Directive 73/148; both
Directives will be repealed by Directive 2004/38).
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provide that Member States must accord every facility to family members to
obtain the necessary visa means that the visa “must be issued without delay
and, as far as possible, at the place of entry into national territory”.15 In any
event, it would be disproportionate to send back at the frontier the family
member who can prove family ties and identity. This part of the ruling is en-
tirely consistent with the purposive interpretation of Community law adopted
by the Court – interpretation which tends to be “very purposive” when indi-
vidual rights are at issue. Not surprisingly, therefore, this part of the ruling
has now been codified in Article 5(4) Directive 2004/38. However, more dif-
ficult to conceptualize, and in many respect to reconcile with the ruling in
Akrich, is the Court’s answer to the second question raised by the national
court. The question related to whether a Member State could legitimately
refuse a residence permit and deport a spouse of a Community national cov-
ered by the free movement provisions on the sole ground that the spouse had
entered the Member State’s territory unlawfully. The issue at stake, as ap-
pears clearly from MRAX pleadings, was exactly that of an unlawfully
present third country national who – after having entered the national terri-
tory – marries a Union citizen covered by the free movement provisions. In
other words, the question (also as understood by the Commission) related to
the possibility to use Community law to rectify the “illegal” status of an im-
migrant through marriage. The Court’s answer, albeit phrased in more gen-
eral terms, seems to endorse this possibility. The Court stated “a Member
State is not permitted to refuse to issue a residence permit and to issue an
expulsion order against a third country national who is able to furnish proof
of his identity and of his marriage to a national of a Member State on the
sole ground that he entered the Member State concerned unlawfully”.16
Therefore, before the ruling in Akrich, it was to be assumed that the legal sta-
tus of third country nationals prior to marriage was immaterial to the
couple’s rights under Community law. However, in Akrich, the Court ex-
cludes from the scope of Regulation 1612/68 – without however mentioning
MRAX – those spouses who, before marriage, are illegally present within the
territory. The two rulings seem therefore inconsistent and it is possible that
the Court has overruled, without saying so, this part of the MRAX ruling.
Furthermore, following MRAX and Akrich, it is not clear what is the legal
situation of a spouse of a Union national who has yet to enter the Union ter-
ritory, i.e. who has never been lawfully present within the Union. The first
part of the ruling in MRAX related, mainly if not only, to those entering the
15. MRAX, supra note 13, para 60.
16. MRAX, supra note 13 para 80 and operative part of the ruling, emphasis added.
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Union territory for the first time.17 In that case the Court accepted that Ar-
ticle 10 Regulation 1612/68 applied, therefore excluding the possibility of
imposing the “individual assessment” required by national immigration
rules. On the other hand, the ruling in Akrich makes the rights derived by
Community law for those spouses conditional upon their being already law-
fully present within the Union territory. It remains unclear therefore whether
the ruling in Akrich also overrules the first part of the ruling in MRAX and
excludes spouses who have not yet entered the Union from the scope of
Regulation 1612/68, or whether we should construe the ruling, despite its
wording, as excluding from the scope of Article 10 only those who are “un-
lawfully present”, rather than all those who are not already lawfully present.
Despite appearances, the distinction is not mere linguistic sophistry but it re-
flects substantive issues, which will determine whether those Union citizens
who marry someone who is not a Union resident will lose the benefits of
seeing their partner admitted and able to work without any significant for-
mality, or whether they will have to undergo the, sometimes rather strict,
tests provided by national immigration law. To put it more simply, had Mr
Akrich joined his wife in Ireland directly from Morocco, would the couple
have enjoyed the rights provided in Article 10 Regulation 1612/68, or would
have they been subject to the more stringent national immigration rules?
Despite the wording of the ruling, the former seems to be the correct solu-
tion, not only because this would be consistent with the purposive and gener-
ous interpretation which characterizes the jurisprudence of the Court in the
field of individual rights, but also because of the very wording of Regulation
1612/68 which (like Art. 5 Directive 2004/38) does not make the spouses’
right to enter and reside conditional upon their being already present in the
territory of the Union. Therefore, even after (and despite) Akrich, the first
part of the ruling in MRAX should still stand and Member States should not
be entitled to deny entry and residence to spouses who are first-comers in
the Union territory unless the derogations apply, with the caveat (added in
Akrich) that marriages of convenience fall altogether outside the scope of Ar-
ticle 10 Regulation 1612/68.18
17. MRAX, supra note 13: “The Belgian State adds that many matters relating to a third
country national can be clarified only by the Belgian representation in his country of origin”
(para 45, emphasis added); “As Community legislation does not specify the measures which a
Member State may take should a third country national married to a Member State national
wish to enter Community territory” (para 57, emphasis added). Thus, it is clear that the situa-
tion at issue in MRAX was whether a first-entrant spouse could be sent back to her country of
origin if her papers were not in order.
18. This is now expressly stated by Art. 35 Directive 2004/38; para 24 of the Preamble to
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This leads us to another difficult question which has yet to be decided by
the Court: if Article 10 Regulation 1612/68 does not apply to sham mar-
riages, are Member States allowed to carry out (on a non-discriminatory ba-
sis) systematic scrutiny on the nature of the relationship, to assess whether
the relationship is one which is significant for Community law purposes?19
The Council Resolution on marriages of convenience, together with a purpo-
sive interpretation of Community law, might suggest a negative answer.20 Ar-
ticle 3 of such Resolution provides that “Where there are factors which
support suspicions for believing that a marriage in one of convenience,
Member States shall issue a residence permit or an authority to reside to the
third-country national on the basis of the marriage only after the authorities
competent under national law have checked that the marriage is not one of
convenience, and that the other conditions relating to entry and residence
have been fulfilled”. The reference to the need for supporting factors cor-
roborating the suspicion over the nature of the marriage before the Member
State is entitled to delay issuing residence permits, seems to imply that there
is no possibility for systematic scrutiny, i.e. for a scrutiny/delay where there
are no factors indicating a marriage of convenience. Even though a Resolu-
tion is only a form of soft law, and therefore not legally conclusive, it is in
line with the general principle enshrined in Directive 64/221 which, whilst
allowing for exchange of information in relation of police records, excludes
the possibility that such enquiries can be made as a matter of routine. Fur-
thermore, there could be no doubt that systematic scrutiny of the nature of
one’s relationship in itself could be construed as a barrier to movement.
5.2. Relationship with existing case law – Carpenter v. Akrich
If the relationship between the ruling in MRAX and Akrich is somehow ob-
scure, the relationship between Akrich and the ruling in Carpenter is even
more complex.21 In Carpenter, Mrs Carpenter was also unlawfully present in
the territory. If it is true that there was no issue in that case of the application
that Directive states that Member States should have the possibility of enacting the necessary
measures against abuse of rights and fraud, and especially marriages of convenience.
19. Of course this problem arises only in those cases in which the nature of the marriage has
not been already cleared in the Member State of origin, as in that case the Member States have
to trust the assessment made by the immigration authorities of that State.
20. Council Resolution of 4 Dec. 1997, O.J. 1997, C 382/1, on measures to be adopted on
the combating of marriages of convenience.
21. Annotated by Acierno under the title “The Carpenter judgement: fundamental rights
and the limits of the Community legal order”, 28 EL Rev. (2003), 398.
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of Regulation 1612/68 and Directives 68/360 and 73/148 (Mr Carpenter was
a service provider who was seeking to establish the right of his wife not to be
deported from his own Member State), the unlawful status of Mrs Carpenter
found no part in the Court’s reasoning. Rather the Court held that the depor-
tation of Mrs Carpenter would affect the conditions under which Mr Carpen-
ter provided intra-Community services, and therefore could be construed as
a barrier to the freedom to provide services. Having established a link with
Article 49 EC, which necessitated the State to justify its strict rules on immi-
gration, the Court could analyse such rules in relation to Article 8 of the Eu-
ropean Convention of Human Rights.22 In Carpenter, the illegal status of
Mrs Carpenter was immaterial. The deportation of Mrs Carpenter was con-
strued as a barrier to the cross-border provision of services and therefore
Community law, and its general principles, applied.
In Akrich, on the other hand, the Court focused solely on the rights pro-
vided by Article 10 Regulation 1612/68. It then found that in that case, i.e.
when the Union citizen is relying on secondary legislation rather than on the
primary Treaty provisions, the lawful or otherwise status of the spouse is rel-
evant and the situation of an “illegal” immigrant does not fall within the
scope of Community law. The different outcome of the two rulings has prob-
ably more to do with the specific facts which gave rise to the cases, than
with a rational and conscious choice of the Court. After all, in Carpenter,
Mrs Carpenter had done nothing illegal besides overstaying her permit; the
marriage was not a sham; there were children involved and the rules, which
required deportation with no consideration given to the actual circumstances
of the individuals affected, were problematic in relation to the right to family
life. On the other hand, Mr Akrich had committed offences in the UK prior
to his marriage; had entered the country illegally (i.e. without even a tourist
visa); and – something which seemed to have considerable weight in the Ad-
vocate General’s mind – the issue was not one of deportation since the
Akrichs could have continued to live together in Ireland. The right to family
life was therefore affected – if at all – considerably less than in the case of
the Carpenters.
However, if the specific circumstances surrounding the two cases might
well explain the different paths followed by the Court, it is difficult to extract
a general rule in relation to the rights and status of family members of Union
citizens who are unlawfully present in the territory of the Union. Do illegal
22. Deportation clearly affects the right to family life enshrined in Art. 8 ECHR; cf. e.g.
European Court of Human Rights rulings in Moestaquim v. Belgium, Judgment of 18 Feb.
1991, Series A No. 193; Nasri v. France, Judgment of 13 July 1995, Series A No. 320–B.
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migrants ever fall within the scope of Community law? There are two pos-
sible answers to this question: first, it could be that the ruling in Akrich over-
rules the ruling in Carpenter. The Court has stepped back and recognized the
exclusive competence of the Member States – lacking harmonizing rules – to
regulate the migration fluxes from outside the Union boundaries. This seems
to be the view endorsed by the Advocate General: only once a third country
national is lawfully present in the Union territory can he derive rights as a
family member of a Union citizen. This solution, consistent with both letter
and spirit of the Akrich ruling, poses one considerable hermeneutic problem:
the Court’s instruction to have due regard to the right to family life as guar-
anteed by the European Convention of Human Rights. If the situation falls
altogether outside the scope of Community law, then Community law does
not and cannot apply. Fundamental rights can be relevant as a matter of na-
tional law, but not as general principles of Community law. The incongruous
reference to the European Convention of Human Rights then could only sig-
nify a considerable expansion of Community law (fundamental rights as gen-
eral principles of Community law always apply regardless of whether the
situation falls within the scope of Community law) which would be highly
questionable from a legal (as well as political) perspective and at odds with
Opinion 2/94 where the Court expressly denied the possibility of a general
fundamental rights competence for the European Community.23 Or else, such
reference would be a (just as legally questionable) reminder to the national
court to take into due consideration the obligations arising in national and in-
ternational law from the European Convention of Human Rights.
Secondly, it could be that the ruling in Akrich does not affect the ruling in
Carpenter and that the scope of the former is much narrower than it might
seem at first sight. The situation of someone unlawfully present within the
Union’s territory falls outside the scope of Article 10 Regulation 1612/68
and therefore there is no “unconditional” right to family reunification. How-
ever, restrictions on the possibility for a Union migrant to bring her spouse
with her can still be seen as an obstacle to the Union citizen’s right to move –
and this regardless of the prior immigration status of the spouse. It needs
therefore to be justified according to an imperative requirement of public in-
terest (which even though not specified in Carpenter would be control of mi-
gration fluxes) and to comply with fundamental rights (and proportionality)
as general principles of Community law. This reading is consistent with the
fact that obstacles to the right to bring family members are first and foremost
23. Opinion 2/94 Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [1996] ECR I-1759.
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obstacles to movement.24 Therefore, if the spouse falls within the scope of
secondary legislation, he will derive extensive rights – to enter/reside/work –
which can be limited only according to the Treaty derogations interpreted
narrowly and in accordance with Directive 64/221. However, if secondary
legislation does not apply, either because the Union citizen resides in her
own Member State or because the spouse does not fall within the scope of
Community secondary legislation, then the immigration rules can still be
seen as an obstacle to the full and effective exercise of the right to free move-
ment enjoyed by the Union citizen and are subject to the proportionality /
fundamental rights scrutiny. After all, it is not the first time that the Court
creates a space between the black letter of secondary legislation, and the
Treaty provisions.25
In this way, not only are the two rulings consistent with each other, but
also the reference to the European Convention of Human Rights in Akrich
can be explained and justified.
6. The rights of Union migrants and their third country national
spouses
To summarize, the situation for third country national spouses of Union citi-
zens who have exercised their free movement right seems to be as follows:
– Member States cannot deny entrance to third country nationals who are
first entering the Union and can prove family ties and identity on the sole
ground that they lack the required visa (MRAX now codified in Art. 5(4) Di-
rective 2004/38). However, marriages of convenience fall outside the scope
of Community law (Akrich) – i.e. do not constitute a relationship relevant for
Community law purposes. The assessment of the nature of the marriage
should not be systematic, but only arise when there are other factors which
point at the possibility of a sham. In this case, the assessment must be made
24. And given that this can hardly be disputed, when will the Court finally recognize that
the non-recognition of rights to same sex partners is in itself a hindrance to movement which
falls within the scope of Community law?
25. Cf. the citizenship case law and in particular Baumbast, supra note 13; see Dougan and
Spaventa “Educating Rudy and the (non-) English Patient: A double-bill on residency rights
under Article 18 EC”, 28 EL Rev. (2003), 699; see also the health care cases, and in particular
Case C-385/99, Müller Fauré v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen
UA, and van Riet v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappi ZAO Zorgverzekeringen, [2003] ECR
I-4509, and Spaventa “Public services and European law: Looking for boundaries” 5 CYELS
(2002–3), 271.
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according to the same criteria that would apply to own nationals (principle of
non-discrimination), and are in any event subject to the principle of propor-
tionality and effectiveness according to general principles of Community
law.
– Regulation 1612/68 and Directives 68/360 and 73/148 confer a right to the
spouse who is already lawfully present within the Union territory to follow
the Union citizen, which can be limited only according to the public policy/
security/health derogations and in compliance with Directive 64/221 (and in
the future Articles 27 et seq. of Directive 2004/38).
– Regulation 1612/68 and Directive 68/360 and 73/148 (and in the future
Directive 2004/38) do not apply to those who have not cleared their immi-
gration status in the Union country from which they are moving in order to
follow their spouses to other Member States. Therefore the host Member
State need not have recourse to the public policy derogation (which is nar-
rowly construed and curtailed by the provisions of Directive 64/221) to deny
entry/residence permits to spouses who are (prior to moving) unlawfully
present within the Union territory (Akrich).
– However, denial of a residence permit or right to enter to the spouse (re-
gardless of prior migration status) of a Union citizen exercising a Treaty free
movement right can be construed as an obstacle falling within the scope of
the free movement provisions, and it has therefore to be justified according
to the broader imperative requirements doctrine (Carpenter), and must com-
ply with fundamental rights and proportionality as general principles of
Community law (Carpenter and Akrich).
7. Conclusions
In several recent rulings the Court seems to have given up hermeneutic clar-
ity and consistency in favour of a case-by-case assessment which is very
much based on the facts which gave rise to the reference, and cannot easily
be extended to other cases the facts of which differ – if only partially – from
previous rulings. This, for a Court which should provide clear guidance to
national judiciaries (and administrative authorities) as to the scope of Com-
munity law, is a regrettable trend, and it is even more open to criticism when
systematically endorsed by the full Court.
The ruling in Akrich, despite appearances, represents only a very limited
concession to the Member States’ regulatory competences in the field of mi-
gration. What it gives with one hand, it almost entirely takes away with the
other. Thus if it clarifies that Community law cannot be used to rectify the
situation of illegally present immigrants, thus excluding the possibility of an
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unconditional Community green card, it also seems to endorse the view – al-
ready expressed in Carpenter – that Community law imposes on the Member
State a duty to respect both proportionality and fundamental rights in apply-
ing their immigration rules.26 Migration policies are yet another field in
which Member States can be regarded as only “semi-sovereign”.
Eleanor Spaventa*
26. On the increased tendency of the Court to subject national law to a general proportion-
ality assessment, see Spaventa “From Gebhard to Carpenter: Towards a (non-)Economic Eu-
ropean Constitution” 41 CML Rev. (2004), 743.
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